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Chapter 7
The Declining Role of Private Defined Benefit
Pension Plans: Who Is Affected, and How
Craig Copeland and Jack VanDerhei
The policy debate over retirement security has focused in part on whether
retirees will have sufficient pension income. As defined benefit (DB)
pension sponsors continue to freeze accruals for new and/or current
employees, they often substitute either new or enhanced defined contribu-
tion (DC) plans in their place. The question is whether the total expected
retirement income from the combination of the frozen DB and any new/
additional 401(k) balances will equal or exceed what employees had antici-
pated receiving from the original DB plan, had it continued without
modifications.
What it might take to indemnify an employee for such a freeze is the
subject of this chapter. Because workers affected by a DB pension freeze
vary according to age, salary, and job tenure, as well as the DB and DC plan
provisions and formulas and the economic assumptions used to estimate
the effects of a pension freeze, there is no simple answer. Prior studies have
indicated how patterns might vary by age and job tenure: older, longer-
tenured workers tend to be affected by a pension freeze from the current
plan sponsor more than younger workers, because they have less time
remaining in their working careers in a 401(k) plan to offset the accrual
loss from the pension freeze (VanDerhei 2006).
In what follows, we first discuss data on the fraction of Americans aged
65 and older receiving annuity income flows from an employer pension.
We also mention how pension income flows vary across various demo-
graphic characteristics and characteristics of the employers providing the
plans. Next we build on newly available information to examine the
financial impact of pension freezes upon the employee population. Of
key relevance is the need for information on what improvements, if any,
tend to be made to DC plans when DB plans are frozen. We draw on
VanDerhei (2007) for this data and the Employee Benefits Research
Institution/Education and Research Fund (EBRI/ERF) Retirement Secu-
rity Project Model to assess the impact of pension freezes on future private
DB plan accruals.
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To summarize findings, we show that benefits as a fraction of preretire-
ment pay would decline by an annual 0.5–2.1 percentage points, depend-
ing on the retiree’s age and sex. Yet some employees, almost one-third of
those under age 35, could do better at retirement due to enhanced DC
contributions.
Trends in pension benefits for Americans
aged 65 and older
DB pensions have traditionally paid retirees periodic lifetime incomes, or
annuities.1 In the US Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, the
percentage of Americans aged 65 and older that reported having a pension
and/or annuity income was 24 percent in 1974, and it rose to almost
38 percent in 1992 (Figure 7.1).2 The fraction subsequently fell to 34 percent
by 2007. In other words, less than 40 percent of Americans aged 65 and
older have ever received pension and/or annuity income. Even among
those with income in the top two quintiles, no more than 62 percent
receive pension incomes in the most recent years of the data (2006–7).
Furthermore, the peak year appears to have been already reached almost
15 years ago.
A similar question is asked in the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), where we see that 35 percent of Americans
aged 65 and older had pension and/or annuity income from their former
employers in 2006 (Table 7.1). If we also include this income from spouse’s
former employers, the fraction rises to 44 percent. These fractions have
fallen below prior surveys (36 and 44 percent in 1998 while 38 and 46 per-
cent in 2003). Younger retirees (aged 65–69) were less likely to have this
type of income with 32 percent in 2006, versus 36 percent or more for those
aged 70 and older. Men and the better educated were also more likely to
have pension income, while White and Black Americans aged 65 and older
were also more likely to have pension income than Hispanic Americans.
For those with pension and/or annuity income, the median amount was
about $9,700 in 2006, up from $9,100 in 2003 (all in 2006 dollars). For
those aged 65–69 receiving pension income, the median annual benefit
was about $12,100, higher than $10,300 for those aged 70–74 and $9,600
for those aged 75–79. Those with a college or postgraduate degree received
pensions worth significantly more, $17,300 and $21,600, respectively.
A unique feature of the SIPP data is that it asks retirees questions about
characteristics of the employers from which they retired along with their
earnings prior to retirement, so that some conclusions can be drawn about
the likelihood of receiving pension income from specific types of employ-
ers. For those aged 65 and older who had worked for pay for at least 5 years
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before retiring, 52 percent received pension and/or annuity income in
2006 (Table 7.2), down from 55 percent in 2003. Those who had worked
for larger firms, were covered by a union and were in the public sector, had
longer job tenure, and earned more were more likely to have pension
income. For instance, a retiree aged 65 and older who had worked at a
larger firm (100 or more employees) had a median annual amount of
$10,700 versus $7,000 or less for retirees from smaller firms. Public-sector
retirees had significantly higher pension incomes ($15,600 versus $6,800)
than those retiring from private-sector jobs. It must be noted that in some
cases, public-sector retirees received no Social Security income, whereas
private-sector retirees did.
The lesson, then, is for the last 30 years in America, at most 40 percent of
the elderly received pension and/or annuity income from an employer. Even
those who retired from a job after 20 or more years with an employer, fewer
than two-thirds, had pension income in 2006. Furthermore, the median
pension income received by former private-sector workers was relatively low,
under $7,000 per year in 2006. While this benefit was valuable to those
receiving it, it was unlikely to free older Americans of financial concern.
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income, by income quintile; 1974–2007. Source : EBRI (2009).
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Table 7.2 Characteristics of Americans age 65 or older who have worked for pay
with pension income and median pension income amounts, by
individual’s former employer characteristics: 2003 and 2006
2003 2006
Number
(M)
Pension
income
from own
former
employer
(%)
Median
yearly
pension
income
amounta
($)
Number
(M)
Pension
income
from own
former
employer
(%)
Median
yearly
pension
income
amounta
($)
Total 23.2 55.2 9,073 24.0 52.2 9,696
Employer size
<10 3.4 20.1 6,319 3.8 18.6 6,564
10–24 1.4 31.5 6,841 1.5 27.7 7,020
25–49 1.3 38.2 6,501 1.1 35.0 6,840
50–99 1.0 38.3 6,319 1.2 43.5 6,000
100 16.1 67.0 9,295 16.4 64.0 10,680
Union status
Covered 6.2 77.1 8,747 6.3 75.7 10,584
Nonunion 17.0 52.8 9,138 17.7 43.9 9,360
Class of worker
Private 15.7 50.4 6,984 16.2 47.1 6,840
Self-employed 1.6 21.8 7,180 1.7 14.0 8,952
Public 5.9 79.0 13,055 6.1 76.6 15,600
Tenure on last job
(years)
<5 1.0 22.4 5,104 1.1 19.0 6,600
5–9 2.8 28.5 4,974 2.5 25.5 3,960
10–19 5.7 46.5 5,209 6.0 45.5 5,160
20 13.7 66.9 10,666 14.4 62.2 12,000
Earnings prior to
retirement (2006 $)
<10,000 2.8 27.8 4,543 3.2 29.9 5,160
10,000–19,999 3.4 43.4 5,483 2.9 35.0 5,352
20,000–29,999 3.3 50.2 5,222 3.3 45.9 6,048
30,000–49,999 5.7 61.3 8,668 5.1 56.5 8,652
50,000 8.0 67.8 13,054 9.6 64.6 12,600
a All pension amounts in 2006 dollars.
Source : Derived from Employee Benefit Research Institute estimates of the 2001 and 2004
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Topical Module 7; see text.
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Pension freezes and DB accruals
The news media has recently focused on the supposedly ‘new’ phenome-
non of pension freezes among private DB plan sponsors for current or new
workers. In fact, however, this practice has been around for some time, part
of the long-term decline of ‘traditional’ DB pension plans in the United
States. What is unusual, of late, is the fact that many large employers have
recently announced pension freezes.
Naturally, pension plan freezes will affect some workers negatively, but it
is not obvious which workers are most affected nor to what degree they are
affected. This is because of the unique characteristics and terms of each
pension plan and each freeze, as well as the age and characteristics of the
affected workers.3 The literature documenting the evolution from DB to
DC retirement plans in the last 20 years is replete with studies analyzing the
change in the relative composition of plans and participants;4 however,
very few have focused on the sizeable number of large plan sponsors that
have had both DB and DC plans in place, at least since the advent of the
401(k) plan in the early 1980s.5 For these sponsors, the primary decision in
many cases is not whether to retain both forms of retirement plan, but how
to manage the liabilities of each in terms of future accruals or contributions.
Recognizing certain legal6 and/or financial constraints, including the inabil-
ity to terminate an underfunded pension plan (with the exception of certain
sponsors satisfying the bankruptcy conditions necessary to trigger pension
insurance coverage by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) and the
imposition of a 20 or 50 percent excise tax on the recoupment of excess
assets in the case of a reversion (VanDerhei 1989), the best choice for many
firms may be to gradually reduce the relative value of the DB plan in the
future by the imposition of a pension freeze.
Retirement program changes after the Pension
Protection Act
After the enactment of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 (Van-
Derhei 2007), the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) and Mercer
fielded a survey designed to elicit information on retirement program
changes. Employers that sponsored DB pension plans were asked to com-
plete the survey. This survey was distributed in 2007making it likely that plan
sponsors would have time and information to do a cost/benefit analysis of
possible plan modifications and/or investment changes. Survey respondents
were asked to indicate what changes they had made, or expected to make, to
their DC plans. One-third of the DB sponsors expected to make an increase
in employer matching contributions, and 21 percent expected to make an
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increase in nonmatching employer contributions. A total of 43 percent of
the DB sponsors indicated that they would increase employer contributions.
Focusing on DB sponsors planning to increase employer contributions
to a DC plan, we also asked whether they had closed their DB plan to new
hires in the last 2 years. A majority (78 percent) of these sponsors indicated
that they would increase employer contributions to the DC plan or planned
to do so in the next 2 years (81 percent). Slightly smaller percentages were
associated with DB sponsors freezing their plans to all members. Of those
that had frozen (would freeze) in the last (next) 2 years, 62 percent
(76 percent) indicated they would increase employer DC contributions.
This makes it very clear that any serious attempt to model retirement
income adequacy for future cohorts of retirees must control for this wide-
spread phenomenon of employers providing new or additional employer
contributions to a DC plan. The reason is that many firms seek to at least
partially compensate employees for lower DB accruals that they may have
expected if the original DB plan had not been closed or frozen.
In the aftermath of PPA, 401(k) plan sponsors must also decide whether
to introduce automatic enrollment features. An extensive literature dis-
cussed the potential benefits of automatic enrollment on participation
rates, especially for young employees and those with low incomes (DiCenzo
2007). But these programs also have a tendency to anchor participants’
contribution rates and asset allocation to the defaults chosen by the spon-
sor (Choi et al. 2005, 2006), and the overall increase in expected account
balances from adopting these plans will be a function of employee relative
wage levels and employer default decisions (Holden and VanDerhei 2005).
The PPA provided a significant incentive for employers that had not
already adopted automatic enrollment to reconsider their decisions.7 It is
interesting that prior surveys of likely adoption rates in the post-PPA
environment have not linked this behavior with sponsor decisions to
close or freeze their DB plans. Yet it has been noted that a shift from DB
to DC plans (especially 401(k) plans) may increase the variability of
retirement income for future cohorts (Samwick and Skinner 2004). At
least among the DB pension sponsors that have closed their plan to new
hires in the last 2 years or are planning to do so in the next 2 years,
VanDerhei (2007) found that a relatively large percentage had already
adopted automatic enrollment in their 401(k) plans (and many who had
not are considering doing so). Of those that already closed their DB plans
to new hires, 59 percent had adopted automatic enrollment features in the
401(k) plan, as opposed to 42 percent of those that had not. Plan sponsors
indicating that they will close the DB plan to new hires in the next 2 years
have also moved to adopt automatic DC enrollment features (61 percent
of the time) versus only 39 percent for those that do not intend to close the
plan in the next 2 years.8
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Impact of freezing new employee DB plan accruals
Next we turn to an analysis of the likely impact of continued trends with
respect to DB plan freezes. Building on the work of VanDerhei (2007) and
VanDerhei and Copeland (2008) using the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security
Projection Model9 we simulate the impacts of freezing new employee
DB plan accruals. Accordingly, we assume that no current employees are
impacted by a DB plan freeze; that is, all DB freezes are assumed to affect
new employees only. Each time an employee is simulated to have a job
change, the probability that he would be covered by a DB plan is computed
based on the assumption that DB plans have not been frozen. The cumula-
tive value of all DB accruals for new jobs is determined for each employee
under the assumption that no terminated vested benefits are commuted to
lump-sum distributions prior to retirement age (which is currently assumed
to be age 65 for all employees).10
We also assume that all private DB plans will be immediately amended so
that any new employees will accrue no pension benefits, and any employee
selected by the model to otherwise have been eligible for a DB plan (in the
absence of a freeze) is assigned a nonelective enhanced11 employer contri-
bution to a DC plan based on the EBRI/Mercer survey described previously.
The enhanced employer contributions are accumulated based on age-
specific asset allocations derived from year-end 2006 Employee Benefit
Research Institute/Investment Company Institute (EBRI/ICI) data (Van-
Derhei et al. 2008). All simulation results use annual returns data from
Ibbotson Associates (2009).12 At age 65, all accumulated account balances
attributed to the enhanced contributions are converted to nominal annu-
ities (for consistency with the DB accruals) using sex-specific annuity pur-
chase prices. Unlike previous applications of the EBRI/ERF model, in this
case the module used to simulate cash-out versus rollover behavior for DC
balances at job change is effectively turned off for any new jobs. This is likely
to overstate the eventual balances attributed to the enhanced contributions,
but it allows a consistent comparison to the DB accruals that would have
resulted but for the new pension freeze scenario.13
The expected reduction in nominal replacement rates if all private DB
plans were to freeze accruals for NEW employees immediately appear in
Figure 7.2, displayed by sex and age. The average reduction is below
1 percent for young (under age 25) and old (55 and older or 60 and
older, depending on sex) employees, and the values peak at slightly over
2 percent for males aged 30–34, and 1.75 percent for females aged 30–34.
While these numbers may seem small, they are computed over a large
segment of the population not expected to have a DB accrual from
future jobs (this is particularly true of the older employees). Therefore,
in Figure 7.3 we display the expected conditional reduction in nominal
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/8/2010, SPi
130 Craig Copeland and Jack VanDerhei
00.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64
(%
)
Age cohort
Male Female
Figure 7.2 Expected reduction in nominal replacement ratios if all private defined
benefit (DB) plans were to freeze accruals for new employees immediately, by sex
and age. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Figure 7.3 Expected conditional reduction in nominal replacement ratios if all
private DB plans were to freeze accruals for new employees immediately, by sex
and age. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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replacement rates if all private DB plans were to freeze accruals for new
employees immediately. In essence, this filters out anyone lacking a new
DB plan from the previous figure. Now the mean reduction in replace-
ment rates is monotonically increasing with age, starting at approximately
1.5 percent for employees currently aged 20–24, and increasing to 8.3 per-
cent for those aged 60–64. The medians are significantly lower than the
means, as expected, and increase until they reach 4 percent at age 55–59
and then drop slightly.
Figure 7.4 shows the percentage of those with DB wealth foregone due to
the freeze who are expected to have a larger total nominal replacement rate
from DC enhanced contributions (if any). As expected, young employees
have the highest percentage, with nearly 40 percent of those between 20 and
24 ending up with more retirement wealth from the annuitized account
balances from the enhanced contributions than they would have had under
the additional DB accruals. This percentage drops to 6 percent for those
aged 55–59.
Finally, Figure 7.5 shows the median percentage of compensation
required as financial indemnification, in the form of an enhanced contri-
bution, for future years covered by a DC plan in lieu of a frozen DB plan.
The majority of employees under age 30 can be financially indemnified
with an employer contribution of 6 percent of compensation; by contrast,
the number increases to nearly 16 percent for those over 60.
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Figure 7.4 Percentage of those with ‘lost’ defined benefit (DB) wealth due to a
pension freeze expected to have a larger total nominal replacement rate from
the enhanced defined contributions (DC) (if any). Source : Authors’ calculations;
see text.
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Conclusion
This chapter investigated how the role of private DB pension plans has
declined since the advent of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
in 1974, by focusing on the falling percentages of Americans aged 65 and
older with pension or annuity income. Even including public-sector retir-
ees, Americans with DB plan income never attained 40 percent of the
retiree population, and the fraction has receded several percentage points
from its highest levels in the early 1990s.
Of course, these historical figures do not reflect the considerable
recent activity in DB freezes for new (and sometimes existing) employees
since 2006. We have simulated the impact of such freezes on expected
future pension wealth for new employees. Looking at this portion of
pension wealth provides one estimate of the impact on overall retirement
wealth but it is incomplete, since many sponsors either increase employer
DC contributions or set up new DC plans. Factoring in these enhanced DC
contributions (if any), we estimate the net loss that future employees may
experience is small overall, amounting to a 0.5–2 percentage point reduction
in replacement rates. Some employees, as many as 30 percent of those aged
35 or younger, may be better off in retirement due to the enhanced con-
tributions.
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Figure 7.5 Median percentage of compensation required as an enhanced employer
contribution for future years covered by a defined contribution (DC) plan in lieu of
a frozen defined benefit (DB) plan for financial indemnification. Source : Authors’
calculations; see text.
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Notes
1 Nevertheless, even DB plans have increasingly given retirees access to lump sums
over time.
2 This excludes distributions fromDC plans or individual retirement accounts; see
EBRI (2009).
3 VanDerhei (2006) provides a detailed analysis of how pension freezes are likely
to impact existing employees as a function of plan type and employee demo-
graphics.
4 For a review of this literature, see Gale, Papke, and VanDerhei (2005).
5 For an analysis that looks at the cash flow implications, see Olsen and VanDerhei
(1997).
6 Another constraint that may be operative for some sponsors is the legal uncer-
tainty surrounding a conversion to a cash balance plan; see VanDerhei (1999).
7 The PPA preempts state laws that might affect plans adopting automatic enroll-
ment provisions and provides additional nondiscrimination safe harbor protec-
tions for them.
8 Sponsors that already closed their plans in the last 2 years are excluded from the
analysis of those in the ‘next 2 years’ group. An analysis of DB sponsors freezing
the plan for all members is less straightforward. While 57 percent of those who
froze the DB plan in the last 2 years indicated they had already adopted 401(k)
automatic enrollment features, compared with 45 percent of those who had not,
the phenomenon is reversed for those planning to freeze the plan in the next
2 years. In that case, only 33 percent of those that plan to freeze their pension
have adopted 401(k) automatic enrollment, as opposed to 46 percent of those
that do not plan to freeze the plan in the next 2 years. However, 42 percent of
those planning to freeze their pension in the next 2 years are currently consid-
ering 401(k) automatic enrollment features.
9 See VanDerhei and Copeland (2003), for a detailed description of the EBRI/
ERF Retirement Security Projection Model.
10 Butrica et al. (2009) uses the Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT) to
simulate the impact of an accelerated transition from DB to DC pensions on the
distribution of retirement income among boomers in a scenario in which em-
ployers freeze all remaining private-sector DB plans and a third of all state and
local plans over the next 5 years.
11 The term ‘enhanced’ includes those with no additional employer contributions
to the DC plan (approximately 21 percent of the DB plan sponsors in the survey
were in this category–in other words, approximately four out of five plans sponsors
in the survey who had frozen or were planning to freeze their DB plans had either
increased employer contributions to an existing DC plan or initiated a new one).
12 Time series returns for the years 1926 through 2008 were used for large cap stocks
and long-term corporate bonds to simulate the portfolios of all 401(k) partici-
pants. Simulated rates of return used a modified version of the method of over-
lapping periods (Cooley, Hubbard, and Walz 2003; Schleef and Eisinger 2007).
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13 Two additional assumptions are used for this analysis: (a) all DB plans are
currently treated as though they were final average pay plans and (b) only
private-sector workers are modeled (and if a worker is currently in the private
sector, it was assumed he or she would remain there until age 65). The first
assumption reflects an upper bound on the expected reductions in future
retirement wealth for most cohorts of DB participants (see VanDerhei (2006)
for a detailed analysis of the various DB plan types). The second assumption is
required as a result of the survey population used to collect the enhanced
contribution information in the EBRI/Mercer survey.
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